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with particular focus on fiscal policy variables: fiscal balance and the size of government. The 
baseline model utilizes a parsimonious specification, drawn from Fischer and Sahay (2000), of 
economic growth as a function of initial conditions, stabilization, market liberalization, and 
structural reform. The paper expands the data used in previous analyses by up to 10 years and 
finds unambiguous evidence that fiscal balance matters for growth, while confirming other 
previous findings on the correlates of economic growth in transition economies. In addition, the 
paper extends the baseline model and explores potential sources of nonlinearities in the 
relationship between growth and public finance. A key finding is that determinants of growth 
may vary in relative importance, depending on the underlying institutional quality. The evidence 
indicates that there could be higher growth payoffs from macroeconomic stability and public 
expenditure in countries characterized by relatively better public sector governance as measured 
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manner: Beyond indicative thresholds of expenditure levels, public spending has a negative 
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Governments engage in a variety of functions, through expenditure policies and 
taxation, mainly to address market failure (i.e., correct externalities and ensure adequate 
provision of public goods and services), or to fulfill some redistributive goal. These so-
called “classical functions” of government have a sound foundation and should be 
conducive to sustained economic growth and poverty reduction. However, in practice, it 
has been difficult to determine whether the “optimal” size of government has been 
reached. It could be argued that while the provision of public goods and services may 
promote growth, the inefficient provision of these goods, through revenue-raising 
mechanisms that distort the allocation of resources, may impede growth (see, e.g. 
Grossman, 1990). More generally, the impact of public finance policies on growth is 
ambiguous and warrants systematic empirical examination. 
 
What are the conceptual linkages between fiscal policy and growth? For one, the 
success of fiscal adjustment is thought to be a critical precondition for economic growth. 
Unsustainable fiscal consolidations are potentially harmful and may weaken investor 
confidence as they fail to set the government’s position on sounder financial footing. 
Sustained fiscal adjustments are also key ingredients in the creation of long-term fiscal 
space for growth-enhancing public expenditures.  
 
In addition to sustained fiscal consolidation efforts, the size of government 
expenditures may also have important consequences for economic growth.  In particular, 
large government expenditure programs are often supported by intrusive regulations that 
curb private sector activities and investment. They may also require higher levels of 
taxation that distort the incentives to work, save, and invest. Moreover, as government 
spending programs grow larger, they may become counterproductive if they are poorly 
designed. They also promote budget rigidity, thus making it more difficult to maintain 
control over fiscal balances. In some cases, these larger government programs create new 
opportunities for rent seeking. The linkages between large government expenditure 
programs and economic growth may thus be mediated by the quality of public sector 
governance, an issue that we explore more fully in this paper. 
 
In countries across Europe and Central Asia (ECA)
2, substantial fiscal 
consolidations have been a key characteristic of the transition to a market economy, with 
a mixed record of success.  There has also been a remarkable evolution in the size of 
government and government expenditure programs, with large variations across 
countries. Over the transition period, there have also been significant variations in the 
magnitude and direction of economic growth. The experiences of the countries in the 
region thus present an opportunity to revisit the empirical links between public finance 
and economic growth.  
                                                 
2 These economies include Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, FYR Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, UNMIK/Kosovo, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 
   3
 
Based on evidence from countries in ECA over the 1992 to 2004 period and using 
a newly constructed fiscal data set by the World Bank, the empirical analysis in this paper 
explores three possible linkages between public finance policies and growth: (i) how 
fiscal deficits affect growth; (ii) the impact of the size of government on growth; (iii) 
linkages with the quality of governance. With respect to the first two components, the 
paper utilizes more recent data, a longer time series, and a broader, more representative 
sample of countries, representing an improvement over the existing literature. As for the 
third component, the growth-expenditure-governance nexus  has not been systematically 
investigated in previous studies, although there is growing indirect evidence that the 
quality of public institutions mediate the impact of the key drivers of growth (see, for 
example, Burnside and Dollar 2000 and 2004).   
 
The main results of the empirical analysis in this paper confirm that a sound fiscal 
position is associated with higher growth in ECA. Lower fiscal imbalances, which are 
associated with greater macroeconomic stability, less business uncertainty, and a stronger 
investment climate, are in turn, conducive to higher growth. However, the size of the 
public sector also affects economic growth in a nonlinear manner. At some indicative 
level of government expenditures in percent of GDP or higher, public spending has a 
measurable negative impact on economic growth, while at levels below that threshold, 
government size has no robust effect on growth. The quality of governance mitigates the 
negative impact of public sector size on growth: Public sector size impinges on growth in 
countries characterized by relatively weaker government effectiveness and public sector 
institutions, but there is no significant evidence of a negative impact when governments 
are relatively more effective. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a review of 
literature on fiscal policy and growth. Section 3 presents the baseline model used in the 
analysis and its motivation. It also discusses the extensions to the baseline model. Section 
4 discusses the data sources and some specification issues. Section 5 reports the main 
findings from the analysis and discusses their implications. Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
2. Review of Related Literature on Fiscal Policy and Growth 
 
The growth literature in transition economies is still relatively in its infancy, 
particularly in the assessment of the links between growth and public finance, owing in 
large part to data constraints.  In fact, it has only been about ten years since the 
emergence of the first empirical studies of economic growth in transition economies (e.g., 
Sachs 1996; de Melo et al 1996; Selowsky and Martin 1997). While the broader 
empirical literature on economic growth has been notoriously unwieldy—a recent meta-
study identifies some 67 variables thought to be significant correlates of growth, based on 
existing studies (Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller, 2004)—there has been, in 
contrast, a remarkable consensus on the determinants of economic growth in transition 
economies. These studies—numbering over 20 published papers as of 2002—are 
reviewed by Havrylyshyn (2001) and Campos and Coricell (2002). The significant   4
variables may be classified under three broad groupings: (i) measures of macroeconomic 
stabilization; (ii) market liberalization and structural reform; and (iii) initial conditions. In 
addition to the remarkable consensus around the key drivers of growth, there is also a 
striking consensus on what are not determinants of growth, in contrast to the broader 
literature on economic growth. For example, “traditional factor inputs” have not been 
found to explain growth in transition economies (Havrylyshyn 2001). Furthermore, two 
variables have not been found to have a statistically significant link with economic 
growth, unlike the rest of the literature: exports and foreign direct investment (FDI).  
 
Despite this consensus, a number of issues are left unresolved in the empirical 
literature on growth in transition economies, particularly with respect to the role of fiscal 
policy. These issues are outlined below. 
 
Does fiscal stability matter for growth? The impact of macroeconomic 
stabilization on economic growth is generally uncontroversial. Stabilization is typically 
measured using the natural log of inflation and its negative impact on growth and its 
statistical significance have been generally unambiguous. However, the results with 
respect to fiscal balance (in percent of GDP)—a complementary measure of 
stabilization—have been mixed (e.g., Fischer and Sahay 2000; Havrylyshyn 2001; 
Purfield 2003), at least in the literature on transition economies. In the literature on 
advanced and developing economies, there have been stronger evidence in support of the 
growth-enhancing effects of fiscal stability. Gupta and others (2002), for example, find 
that strong budgetary positions as well as fiscal consolidation are associated with higher 
economic growth in both the short-term and the long-term. 
 
The role of public investments or “productive” expenditures. The broader 
literature on economic growth, drawing from developing country as well as developed 
country experiences, yields a mixed record for the impact of public investment on 
economic growth. In an effort to estimate how the structure of taxation and the 
composition of public expenditures affect growth rates of a country, Kneller (1999) uses 
data for 22 OECD countries (1970-1995) to expenditures with a substantial (physical or 
human) capital component are classified as “productive” while social security and other 
expenditures were considered “unproductive” Not surprisingly, the paper concludes that 




While not explicitly classifying expenditures productive or unproductive, Gupta 
and others (2002) use a panel of 39 low-income countries between 1990 and 2000 and 
find that the composition of public outlays is important: Where spending is 
disproportionately allocated to wages, countries have tended to experience lower growth, 
while countries that allocate higher shares of spending to capital and non-wage goods and 
services have experienced more rapid economic expansion. In particular, the results 
suggest that a one percent increase in the allocation of public spending to capital outlays 
can raise the growth rate by 0.1 percentage point in the long term and by almost 0.5 of 
                                                 
3 Interestingly, the analysis shows, that magnitude of the estimated impacts of (productive) expenditures 
and (distortionary) taxation are sensitive to the process of (5-year) averaging of the data.   5
one percentage point of GDP in the short term. Bose (2003) also finds that the share of 
government capital expenditure in GDP is positively and significantly correlated with 
economic growth, though current expenditure is insignificant. The study is based on a 
panel sample of 30 developing countries over the period between 1970 and 1990. At the 
sector level, government investment and total expenditures in education appeared to be 
the only outlays significantly associated with growth, once the budget constraint and 
omitted variables were taken into consideration. Analysis of both total expenditure in 
education and investment in education provide support to this conclusion. 
 
However, a recent review (IMF 2004) suggests weak links between public 
investment growth that may be due to a number of factors, including the narrow scope of 
public investment as a measure of productivity-enhancing expenditure components (i.e., 
social spending may boost the stock and quality of human capital); the use of gross rather 
than net investment (i.e., gross public investment minus depreciation) imperfectly 
measures the net addition to the public capital stock; and physical indicators (e.g., share 
of paved roads) may be a better measure of productive investment, as they measure the 
output of public investment that may have a more direct, causal effect on growth. 
 
Are the key drivers of economic growth time-varying? In his review of the first 
decade of empirical research on growth in transition economies, Havrylyshyn (2001) 
suggests that larger samples may permit the further refinements to the general consensus, 
to show, for example, how some variables may be relatively important initially, but may 
decline in importance over time. Similarly, using larger samples, it may be possible to 
show how the impact of public finance may have evolved over time. A broad consensus 
emerged from the first decade of empirical research on growth in transition economies. 
Since then, some recent studies have updated the data used in the analysis through 2001 
(e.g., Godoy and Stiglitz 2006) and questioned the relative importance of some of the key 
variables from the early literature (e.g., structural reform). Thus one possibility is the 
shifting relative importance of the main determinants of growth in transition economies. 
In particular, transition economies have made significant advances in macroeconomic 
stabilization and structural reform over time. This leads us to expect that the “first-
generation” determinants of growth may have weaker impact in recent years. Where there 
remains an unfinished policy agenda, such as in fiscal consolidation, we would expect 
variables such as fiscal balances to have significantly more perceptible effects on 
economic growth.  
 
Does the size of government matter for growth?  There appears to be no existing 
consensus on the appropriate size of government (see Gupta et al 2003 for a review of the 
literature). Nonetheless, assessing desirable levels of expenditure is critical because 
excessive levels of spending not aligned with available resources may lead to 
unsustainable deficits, which in turn may trigger macroeconomic instability (Devarajan et 
al 2001). In addition, some have speculated that disproportionate levels of expenditure 
may have adverse effects on economic growth. De la Fuente (1997) provides evidence in 
support of the view that government expenditures have a negative impact on income 
levels and growth rates. Based on the sample of selected OECD countries (two periods: 
1960-1993 and 1970-1995), evidence suggests that a reduction of total government   6
expenditures would increase the annual growth rate of the average EU country. 
Moreover, public expenditure tended to crowd out private investment by reducing private 
disposable income and the incentive to save. The estimates indicate that each $1 increase 
in government expenditures reduced private investment by about $0.32. De la Fuente also 
found empirical evidence that increases in the overall size of government—measured by 
the share of total government expenditures in GDP—are associated with a sizable 
reduction in the level of productivity through an “externality effect” arising from various 
types of distortions. 
 
Grossman (1990) provides a succinct summary of the literature on growth and the 
size of government: on one hand, the provision of public goods and services in principle 
contributes positively to growth; on the other hand, this also may contribute negatively to 
growth through the inefficient provision of these goods and revenue-raising mechanisms 
that distort the allocation of resources. Meanwhile, Fischer and others (1996) suggest that 
sharp reductions in expenditures at very large scales seen during the early transition may 
themselves have negatively affected the reform process. 
 
The empirical literature on economic growth in transition economies have 
generally found, or assumed, that the standard determinants of growth do not apply to 
transition economies. Thus few papers discuss explicitly the link between government 
expenditure and growth in transition economies. These papers—such as those that 
produce long-run growth projections for transition economies (Fischer and others 1998; 
Coricelli 1997; Wagner and Hlouskova 2005)—assume based on findings from standard 
empirical models of growth that a significant, negative link exists.  For example, rather 
than test the statistical link between public expenditure and growth in transition 
economies, Fischer and others (1998) produced long-term growth forecasts for these 
economies based on Barro’s (1991) growth equation, which models growth as a negative 
function of government consumption. Wagner and Hlouskova (2005) follow the same 
“indirect approach,” using growth regressions results based on the older EU member 
states to make projections for the new EU member states, based in part on a negative link 
between public consumption and growth.  
 
Fidrmuc (2001) has criticized this indirect approach of using existing growth 
equations and has argued that growth forecasts for transition economies need to account 
instead for “transition-specific” factors. In addition, Barro’s (1991) findings with respect 
to size of government are not definitive. Levine and Renelt (1992) are unable to find 
robust significant links between government expenditure and growth, although they find 
that the relationship is generally negative. Some have suggested that there may be 
“thresholds” in the links between size of government and growth (Chen and Lee 2005). It 
has also been argued that the composition of government expenditure matters (Devarajan 
and others 1996). 
 
What do we know of the statistical link between public expenditure and growth in 
transition economies, from studies that have actually sought to examine it? First, the 
evidence on the links between the size of government and growth is inconclusive. Chu 
and Schwartz (1994) find insignificant links while Campos (2000) finds a positive,   7
though generally insignificant, impact of government consumption on growth. Beck and 
Laeven (2005) find a negative, insignificant link between government consumption and 
average GDP per capita growth while Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1997) find a positive 
insignificant link. Second, the empirical work has been subject to severe data constraints. 
Many of the reported regression results are, in fact, based on very small sample sizes. 
Fidrmuc and Tichit (2004) are unable to incorporate a measure of government 
consumption in their growth regression because this effectively reduces the number of 
observations by over a third of their sample size. Beck and Laeven (2005) use 24 
observations while Brunetti and others (1997) use a sample of about 18 observations. 
Third, there is recent evidence of a significant negative link between public spending and 
growth. Åslund and Jenish (2005) suggest that expenditure reductions have underpinned 
economic growth in the region from 1999 onwards, particularly among CIS countries. 
Fourth, some have suggested that the relationship between the size of government and 
growth may be nonlinear. Barro (1990) presents a theoretical model of endogenous 
economic growth that yields a nonlinear (inverted U) relationship between the rate of 
growth of per capita income and the size of government. Bajo-Rubio (2000) reproduces 
this same relationship but in a more general (Solow) growth model. There have been few 
empirical investigations of this nonlinear relationship. Chen and Lee (2005), examine the 
data on Taiwan and suggest that there may be a threshold level of public expenditure (in 
their case, the threshold is about 23 percent of GDP for total government consumption) 
under which government expansion has a positive impact on growth and beyond which 
there can be adverse effects on growth.
4 To the best of our knowledge, this dimension of 
economic growth has not been systematically investigated using data on transition 
economies. 
  
Does the institutional quality matter? Are there measurable differences in the 
growth performance and its correlates between countries with relatively lower 
institutional quality and countries with relatively higher institutional quality? In 
particular, does government efficiency matter for the impact of expenditure on growth? 
While, to the best of our knowledge, this has not been investigated in the growth 
literature, there is plenty of indirect evidence that the quality of public institutions 
mediate the impact of the key drivers of growth. See, for example, the literature on aid, 
growth, and good policies (Burnside and Dollar 2000 and 2004). 
 
  How can good governance mitigate the negative impact of big governments? 
Given public sector institutions, governance, and social preferences, the marginal benefit 
of public expenditure is expected to fall as the size of expenditure programs grows larger. 
Similarly, the marginal cost of taxation is expected to increase as the tax burden rises, 
recognizing that high taxes may distort the incentives to invest and participate in the labor 
force. Although internal political dynamics may complicate outcomes, public 
expenditures in a given country would be expected to increase until their marginal 
benefits equal the marginal cost of taxes required for their financing (Figure 1, point A).  
 
                                                 
4 Other empirical studies of this nonlinearity include Grossman (1988), Dowrick (1996) and a very recent 
study of East Asian economies (Knowles and Garces-Ozanne 2003).   8
Better quality of public sector governance may be expected to affect both 
determinants of government size: First, the marginal benefit of a given level of public 
expenditures rises. In particular, program design, resource management, and service 
delivery would improve outcomes, for example, in health care or education. At the same 
time, the marginal cost of a given level of taxes falls, as better tax administration and tax 
policy can help raise revenues in less distorting ways. With better-than-average quality of 
governance (as in many high-income OECD countries), the “optimal” size of 
government—as measured by the size of public expenditures and taxes—could thus 
increase compared to a typical country (Figure 1, point A*). In this case, a larger 
government would not necessarily exert a negative impact on efficiency and growth.  
 






In the case where public expenditures and taxes in the typical country (with 
average quality of governance) both rise to the levels represented by E* and T*, a gap is 
effectively created between a higher marginal cost of taxes (point C) and a lower 
marginal benefit of expenditures (point B). This misalignment of marginal cost and 
benefits, as is well-known in the literature, creates an efficiency loss (or “deadweight 
loss”), represented by the familiar “Harberger triangle” ABC. We expect that the larger 
the efficiency loss, the bigger the negative impact of a larger government size on growth. 
On the other hand, efficiency losses will not be significant unless the size of government 
exceeds the “optimal size.” The association of large public expenditures with lower 
economic growth, beyond a certain threshold of expenditure, when the quality of 
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sector governance     9
 
Objectives of This Paper 
 
This paper updates the early empirical literature on economic growth in transition 
economies, with particular focus on fiscal policy variables (fiscal balance as well as the 
size of government and selected expenditure components). It expands the panel data 
sample, relative to the existing literature, by some 7 to 10 years of additional data, 
representing a doubling of existing sample sizes. It utilizes a parsimonious model drawn 
from Fischer and Sahay (2000) of economic growth as a function of initial conditions, 
stabilization, liberalization and structural reform, consistent with existing empirical 
literature.  
 
Allowing for the possibility that the coefficient estimates of the Fischer-Sahay 
model may vary over time and by quality of governance, as explained in the next section, 
this note expands the earlier literature by focusing on potential sources of nonlinearities: 
First, it explores the possibility that the key drivers of economic growth may be shifting 
in relative importance over time. Second, it allows for the possibility that the 
determinants of economic growth may vary in significance and importance, depending on 
the country-specific quality of governance or public sector institutions. The correlates of 
growth that may depend on the underlying institutional quality include such variables as 
public investments. Third, it allows for the possibility that there are measurable 
thresholds in the impact of the size of government on economic growth. 
 
3. Empirical Framework: Baseline Model and Extensions 
 
In general, as previously discussed, three broad conclusions on the underlying 
determinants of economic growth in transition emerge from the first decade of empirical 
analysis (see, for example, Havrylyshyn 2001; Campos and Coricell 2002; World Bank 
2002). These studies draw from both cross-sectional studies and panel data analyses and 
conclude that the following matter significantly for economic growth: (i) macroeconomic 
stabilization; (ii) market liberalization and structural reforms; and (iii) initial conditions. 
The specific measures and indexes of macroeconomic stabilization (fiscal balance, 
inflation, or some other measure), reform, and initial conditions have tended to vary from 




This note utilizes a parsimonious regression model drawn from Fischer and Sahay 
(2000) reflecting the findings of the first decade of empirical research. In particular, our 
baseline specification is of the following general form: 
 
t i t i t i t i t i t i EBLIB EBSM FIS INF WD Gr , 5 , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 0 , β β β β β β + + + + + =  (1) 
 
where GRi,t is the real GDP per capita growth rate; WDi,t is a war dummy or an index of 
armed conflict; INFi,t is the natural log of inflation; FISi,t is the fiscal balance in percent 
of GDP, with positive values denoting fiscal surpluses; and EBSMi,t and EBLIBi,t are the   10
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) indexes of small-scale 
privatization and price liberalization, respectively, with higher values indicating greater 
progress in structural reform
5; and i and t are country and year indexes, respectively. The 
independent variables correspond to measures of initial condition (WD), macroeconomic 
stabilization (INF and FIS), and liberalization or structural reform (EBSM and EBLIB). 
Alternative measures of initial conditions are a set of indexes developed by de Melo et al 
(1996) based on principal components analysis. Based on the existing literature we 
expect WD and INF to be negatively, and FIS, EBSM and EBLIB to be positively, related 
to growth; that is β1<0 and β2<0 and β3>0, β4>0 and β5>0. 
 
An alternative measure of policy reform is the overall index of reform progress 
(IRP) which is the unweighted sum of the EBRD indexes of reform. This measure 
follows Sachs (1996), although Sachs used only a simple bivariate model of economic 
growth for the 1990 to 1995 period.
6 Fischer and Sahay (2000) use a similar composite 
measure, drawn from three indexes of reform. Substituting IRP into equation (1) yields 
the following regression model: 
 




Following the early literature, we use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to estimate 
equation (1). To test the robustness of the baseline results and account for cross-country 
heterogeneity, we also utilize other econometric methods, such as fixed effects (FE) and 
random effects (RE) estimators. In addition, we expand the baseline model to explore 
some additional questions: 
 
Are the key drivers of economic growth time-varying? Rather than treat the 
relative importance of the drivers of growth in a static sense, we nest the findings from 
the early literature and the more recent literature in a single framework, by allowing they 
key coefficients to vary over time. This allows for the possibility that some elements may 
have been key drivers of growth in the early transition period, but may have diminished 
in importance over time, or vice-versa. This suggests the following regression models: 
 
t i t i t i t i t i IRP FIS INF WD Gr , 6 , 3 , 2 , 1 0 , α α α α α + + + + =    at t<t*   (3) 
 
t i t i t i t i t i IRP FIS INF WD Gr , 6 , 3 , 2 , 1 0 , * * α α α α α + + + + =  at  t>=t* (3*) 
 
One simple test for this proposition is a test of structural break at t* or pooling the 
data for all t and testing the interaction between a time dummy (for the period before and 
after t*) and the fiscal balance and reform progress variables. There are no prior reasons 
                                                 
5 Of the nine EBRD indexes of reform, Fischer and Sahay (2000) concluded that EBSM and EBLIB are the 
significant determinants of economic growth.  
6 A preliminary regression analysis using this bivariate specification yields a coefficient estimate (0.62) 
similar to Sachs’ (1996) and significant at the 1 percent level.   11
for preferring one year over another for setting the structural break. As a rough 
approximation, we use the midpoint (1998), to give us roughly the same sample size for 
the two sub-samples. The years through 1998 also correspond roughly to the “early 
transition period” which includes the years of the output decline across most of transition 
economies.  
 
An additional dimension of time-varying effects of determinants of growth is the 
lagged impact of these variables. Using equation (2), but allowing for a lagged impact of 
structural reforms on economic growth, gives us: 
 
1 , 8 1 , 7 , 6 , 3 , 2 , 1 0 , − − + + + + + + = t i t i t i t i t i t i t i IRP IRP IRP FIS INF WD Gr β β β β β β β  (4) 
 
The specification of the overall index of reform in Equation (4) follows that of 
Selowsky and Martin (1997) and Havrylyshyn and van Rooden (2003). This is based on 
the idea that the impact of policy reform may be spread over time. In addition, previous 
empirical studies have suggested that the contemporaneous effects may be negative due 
to adjustment costs, but may be compensated by subsequent positive effects.
7   
 
Are there nonlinearities due to governance and institutional quality? Data on 
governance measures are still only available for a limited period. They also have limited 
variance over time, limiting their usefulness for panel data analysis. Nonetheless, we can 
still use available indicators to examine how governance affects the relationship between 
economic growth and its key drivers. In particular, we use governance indicators to create 
sub-samples of countries based on their institutional quality; we then re-run the baseline 
regressions. We compare the coefficients estimates from the two sets of regressions and 
test for statistically significant differences. 
 
Are there threshold effects? From the review of the empirical literature on growth 
and the size of government in the preceding section, we conclude that a new study of the 
size of government and growth is warranted and such a study can draw from the 
availability of more recent and richer data. An important advancement over the existing 
literature is our effort to test the common assumption of a linear relationship between size 
and growth and allow, instead, threshold effect in the links between expenditure and 






Descriptive statistics and the main data sources of the variables used in the 
analysis are provided in Table 1. As explained below, most of the variables are from the 
data collected by World Bank (ECSPE) staff, supplemented with data from the IMF and 
EBRD and other specialized datasets (such as the World Bank Governance Indicator 
                                                 
7 This is also consistent with Falcetti, Raiser, and Sanfey (2002) but they employ a simultaneous equation 
system. 
8 We can estimate a threshold model that allows either a continuous jump or a discontinuous jump. We 
found that the results are invariant to the specification of the threshold model.    12
database). About 25 countries are covered in the analysis over the period 1992 to 2004, 
depending on the data source.  
 
Data on real GDP growth rate (GR) are from national authorities and World Bank 
staff estimates. Because there are notable outliers in the dataset (in particular, the 
summary statistics indicate minimum and maximum values corresponding to -44 percent 
and +81 percent, respectively), we also use data from the IMF’s World Economic 
Outlook (WEO) database. There are fewer observations from the IMF-WEO but the 
range of values is also much narrower (and likely more plausible). As will be shown 
below, however, the results are largely invariant to data source. Data on inflation are 
calculated from CPI data drawn from the IMF-WEO database.  
 
The index of armed conflict or war dummy is constructed using information from 
two sources: (i) Armed Conflict Events Data, following the work of Staehr (2003); and 
(ii) the Uppsala Armed Conflict dataset.
9 The dummy takes on a value of [1] during years 
of conflict and [0] otherwise. Data on fiscal balance and public investment in percent of 
GDP are from Bank staff estimates. As an alternative, we also use data on fiscal balance 
from the EBRD. The indexes of reform are from de Melo et al (1996) and from the 
EBRD as indicated.  
 
Our measure of government effectiveness is based on the World Bank’s 
Governance Indicator database (see also the Data Appendix). In particular, the 
“government effectiveness” measure, which purports to measure “the competence of the 
bureaucracy and the quality of public service delivery” (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 
2005). An alternative measure of government effectiveness weights the level indicator by 
its standard error, to place greater weight on indexes whose values have narrower 
variations (and are thus more consistent across their survey sources). We also use a few 
other proxies for governance. For example, we use data on bribes in percent of annual 
sales drawn from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
(BEEPS). We also use data on quality of public sector institutions from the World Bank’s 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA); in particular, we use the overall 
rating for Public Sector Management and Institutions. 
 
There are two well-known constraints by the empirical literature on growth in 
transition economies, and this paper is not an exception. The first is the use of official 
GDP data, despite unofficial economic activity that is perceived to be significant. The 
second is the relatively short time span covered by these studies, and thus preventing the 
use of more sophisticated, dynamic specification. Nonetheless, the data used in this note 
represent significant improvements over the existing literature, in terms of both quantity 
and quality. First, while the total number of observations varies according to the 
regression specification, some 25 countries are now covered over a 12-year period 
yielding a total sample size of up to 300 observations—about double the number of 
observations used in some of the first empirical studies. Second, many of the data series 
                                                 
9 Downloaded from www.onwar.com/aced/index.htm and 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/our_data1.htm respectively.   13
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Growth (WB) overall 2.0 10.7 -44.1 89.4 N =     320
between 4.2 -4.1 18.4 n =      25
within 9.9 -42.3 73.0 T-bar =    12.8
Growth (IMF) overall 2.8 7.4 -23.4 29.6 N =     290
between 2.6 -1.1 9.5 n =      25
within 7.0 -22.7 25.6 T-bar =    11.6
War Dummy overall 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0 N =     325
between 0.1 0.0 0.5 n =      25
within 0.2 -0.4 1.0 T =      13
Ln(inflation) (WB) overall 2.7 1.8 -3.0 8.5 N =     252
between 0.9 1.3 4.9 n =      22
within 1.6 -2.1 8.2 T-bar = 11.4545
Ln(inflation) (IMF) overall 3.0 2.1 -2.3 9.7 N =     305
between 1.0 0.4 5.0 n =      25
within 1.8 -1.1 9.1 T-bar =    12.2
Fiscal Balance (in percent of GDP) (WB) overall -3.5 4.1 -30.6 3.0 N =     251
between 2.5 -9.8 0.2 n =      24
within 3.2 -26.5 3.2 T-bar = 10.4583
Fiscal Balance (in percent of GDP) (IMF) overall -4.7 6.5 -56.8 4.9 N =     316
between 3.2 -12.3 0.0 n =      25
within 5.6 -49.2 9.5 T-bar =   12.64
Fiscal Balance (in percent of GDP) (EBRD) overall -4.5 5.1 -31.2 5.0 N =     305
between 2.6 -10.9 0.2 n =      25
within 4.4 -27.8 5.4 T-bar =    12.2
Liberalization Index (de Melo et al 1996) overall 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.8 N =     286
between 0.2 0.3 0.8 n =      22
within 0.0 0.6 0.6 T =      13
EDRD Index of small-scale privatization overall 3.5 0.9 1.0 4.3 N =     325
between 0.6 2.0 4.2 n =      25
within 0.6 1.1 4.6 T =      13
EDRD Index of price liberalization overall 3.8 0.6 1.0 4.3 N =     325
between 0.4 2.8 4.3 n =      25
within 0.5 1.4 5.0 T =      13
Index of Reform Progress overall 23.7 6.2 10.0 34.7 N =     325
between 4.9 14.9 32.1 n =      25
within 4.0 10.7 30.3 T =      13
Private investment (% of GDP) overall 16.6 6.6 0.0 49.9 N =     225
between 4.9 7.9 28.8 n =      23
within 4.3 0.3 37.7 T-bar = 9.78261
Public investment (% of GDP) overall 4.4 2.3 0.0 15.5 N =     245
between 1.7 1.5 8.6 n =      24
within 1.6 -4.2 12.7 T-bar = 10.2083
Total government expenditure (% of GDP) (WB) overall 36.1 11.9 5.4 68.4 N =     262
between 10.6 15.2 56.8 n =      25
within 6.1 17.9 73.6 T-bar =   10.48
Total government expenditure (% of GDP) (IMF) overall 37.2 11.2 10.9 84.9 N =     316
between 9.2 12.7 52.8 n =      25
within 7.4 20.2 89.3 T-bar =   12.64
Government effectiveness overall -0.2 0.6 -1.5 1.0 N =     248
between 0.6 -1.3 0.8 n =      25    14
have undergone backward revisions over time, representing some improvement in 
quality.  
 
The next section presents the main results of our analysis. A large, additional set 
of analyses based on variations on the specifications presented in the next section yield 
basically the same results. These results, summarized in some 36 different tables are 
available on request from the authors. 
 
5. Main Results and Discussion 
 
A.  Baseline Results and Some Simple Extensions 
 
Table 2 presents the main results from the baseline regression analysis. In this and 
in other Tables in the main text, our choice of variable has in part been determined by the 
resulting total number of observations. For example, because fiscal balances data from 
the IMF-WEO yield the most number of observations, we use this data source rather than 
the WB data or EBRD data. The results however are invariant to data source, as is clear 
from the Appendix Tables. In addition, where data on a particular variable can be drawn 
from several sources, data from these sources are typically closely correlated, with 
correlation coefficients of 0.92 or higher. In the case of inflation, for example, data from 
the IMF-WEO and from WB have a correlation coefficient of 0.92. Data on total 
government expenditure are much less similar, though the correlation coefficients are still 
relatively high, over 0.70. 
 
The results in Table 2 confirm the broad findings from the previous literature, 
namely, initial conditions, macroeconomic stabilization, and liberalization and structural 
reform all matter for growth and are in the expected direction. The second measure of 
structural reform, price liberalization, is however, not significant. The explanatory power 
of the baseline model is broadly comparable with earlier finding, with R-squares of 0.50 
to 0.59. The main results are robust to estimation methods, representing an improvement 
over the previous literature which relied heavily on simple OLS regressions (e.g., Sachs 
1996; Fischer and Sahay 2000). One important new result is the robustness of fiscal 
balance as a positive determinant of growth. It may be recalled from Section 2 that the 
existing literature has yielded a mixed record on the importance of fiscal consolidation. 
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Table 2. Determinants of Economic Growth, 1992-2004
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
War dummy -4.11 -5.34*** -4.51** -4.51 -5.17*** -4.73***
(1.52) (2.83) (2.50) (1.60) (2.64) (2.58)
Ln(inflation) (IMF) -1.95*** -1.12*** -1.72*** -2.33*** -1.60*** -2.20***
(5.56) (3.35) (5.81) (6.97) (4.14) (7.24)
Fiscal balance (%GDP) (IMF) 0.37** 0.39*** 0.40*** 0.38** 0.46*** 0.43***
(2.54) (5.03) (5.57) (2.55) (5.89) (5.88)
EDRD Index of small-scale privatization 1.38* 4.83*** 2.42***
(1.82) (5.11) (3.22)
EDRD Index of price liberalization -0.58 -0.34 -0.62
(0.41) (0.34) (0.65)
Index of Reform Progress -0.04 0.39** 0.04
(0.34) (2.19) (0.34)
Constant 6.85 -8.42 2.95 11.60*** -0.47 9.57***
(1.11) (1.57) (0.67) (3.00) (0.09) (2.76)
Observations 305 305 305 305 305 305
R-squared 0.51 0.59 0.5 0.56
Number of countries 25 25 25 25
Robust t statistics in parentheses. Dependent variable is Economic Growth (WB)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
 
 
The baseline results appear to be robust to various specifications. For example, 
the IRP reform measure can be used in place of the EBRD reform indexes. The results, 
based on equation (2) and presented in columns 4 to 6 of Table 2 are similar to those in 
columns 1 to 3, although IRP itself does not appear to be consistently significant. IRP has 
a significant effect using a fixed effects estimator, but not for OLS nor for random 
effects. The impact of fiscal balance, however, is consistent and robust, and so are the 
war dummy and inflation.  
 
We also test the results for the inclusion of an alternative measure of initial 
conditions—initial income per capita in 1992, a measure of initial conditions typically 
used in the broader literature on growth but not in literature on transition economies, 
possibly because data for early transition period are more likely to be measured with 
error. The results (not shown) using OLS and Random Effects regression method remain 
consistent with the baseline results. With respect to initial income, the results suggest 
some convergence over time: economies with higher per capita income in 1992 grew 
more slowly thereafter. 
 
B.  Time-Varying Effects 
 
We begin this section with two observations from the previous section. First, 
while the impact of fiscal balance has been mixed in the previous literature, we are able 
to provide relatively more robust evidence that fiscal balance matters for growth. Second, 
Sachs (1996) provides evidence that IRP is a strongly significant determinant of 
economic growth although we are unable to provide robust confirmation. Consistent with 
the discussion in Section 2, these two observations may be explained in part by the 
continually evolving relative importance of the main determinants of growth in transition 
economies. That is, overall reform progress may have been important during the first   16
decade of transition, but less so during the latter stages, as reform programs have 
advanced in many of the transition economies.
10 In 1995, only one country had an IRP 
above 30 (Hungary); in 2005, ten countries have IRPs above this threshold.  The shifting 
relative importance of drivers of growth may also help explain why the early literature 
transition economy growth did not yield consistent findings on the importance of fiscal 
balance yet in our baseline results the positive impact of fiscal balance on economic 
growth is unambiguous and robust. 
 
The results are presented in Table 3 and provide some evidence of the time-
varying impact of fiscal balance and reform progress. The results under column (2), for 
example, based on fixed effects, imply that the net impact of fiscal balance on economic 
growth through 1998 is about 0.36 and more than double at 0.77 thereafter. As for IRP, 
its net impact on growth is 0.50 through 1998, and not statistically different from 0 
thereafter. 
 
Table 3. Determinants of Economic Growth, 1992-2004: Accounting for Time-Varying Effects
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
War dummy -4.18 -5.33*** -4.65*** -4.51 -7.20*** -4.51***
(1.43) (2.75) (2.60) (1.64) (3.76) (2.70)
Ln(inflation) (IMF) -1.89*** -1.47*** -1.83*** -1.65*** -1.71*** -1.65***
(4.39) (3.77) (5.59) (4.18) (4.30) (4.97)
Fiscal balance (%GDP) (IMF) 0.57*** 0.77*** 0.65*** 0.44*** 0.75*** 0.44**
(6.02) (3.79) (3.48) (4.27) (3.58) (2.36)
Fiscal balance (%GDP) * Dummy (years through 1998) -0.3 -0.41* -0.35* -0.21 -0.44** -0.21
(1.59) (1.94) (1.74) (1.20) (2.00) (1.04)
Index of Reform Progress -0.33** 0.09 -0.27** -0.33** -0.88*** -0.33***
(2.24) (0.40) (2.04) (2.47) (3.21) (2.92)
Index of Reform Progress * Dummy (years through 1998) 0.66*** 0.50*** 0.62*** 0.45** 0.39** 0.45***
(3.04) (3.18) (4.11) (2.17) (2.53) (2.93)
Constant 19.39*** 8.06 17.89*** 5.32 7.77 5.32
(4.36) (1.32) (4.76) (0.94) (1.37) (1.36)
Observations 305 305 305 305 305 305
R-squared 0.54 0.58 0.6 0.64
Number of countries 25 25 25 25
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
 
C.  Lagged Effects 
 
Using equation (4), we can re-run the baseline regressions but allowing for the 
lagged impact of reform progress. The results are presented in Table 4 and suggest 
negative contemporaneous effects (though insignificant) and lagged positive effects from 
                                                 
10 This may also explain, in part, why Godoy and Stiglitz (2006) why, using more recent data, some 
variables which thought to “play a large role in the earlier literature, appear to have at most a marginal 
effect.”   17
policy reform (after two period, through 1998), broadly consistent with the existing 
literature. These cumulative effects are less perceptible in recent years, as expected.
11  
 
Table 4. Determinants of Economic Growth, 1992-2004: Lagged Effects and Time-Varying Impact
All Through 1998 1999 Onwards
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
War dummy -2.49 -4.60** -3.1 3.41 1.45 1.52 -18.39*** -20.30*** -18.58***
(0.68) (2.15) (1.55) (0.90) (0.49) (0.58) (2.80) (6.24) (6.66)
Ln(inflation) -1.70*** -1.44*** -1.62*** -3.24*** -3.24*** -3.32*** -0.29 -0.08 -0.29
(4.71) (3.39) (5.15) (4.47) (4.54) (5.80) (1.07) (0.18) (0.98)
Fiscal balance (%GDP) (IMF) 0.46*** 0.78*** 0.55*** 0.16 0.49* 0.36* 0.49*** 0.58*** 0.49***
(3.53) (5.94) (4.92) (0.79) (1.86) (1.66) (6.39) (3.35) (4.44)
Overall index of reform (t) -0.31 -0.70* -0.38 0.17 -0.42 -0.15 -0.77* -1.48** -0.84
(0.65) (1.77) (1.12) (0.32) (0.84) (0.38) (1.74) (2.07) (1.43)
Overall index of reform (t-1) -0.2 -0.03 -0.15 -0.57 -0.64 -0.67 0.54 1.05 0.6
(0.35) (0.06) (0.32) (0.92) (1.20) (1.33) (0.94) (1.24) (0.75)
Overall index of reform (t-2) 0.39 0.44* 0.40 0.38 0.58* 0.51* 0.00 0.09 0.02
(1.49) (1.67) (1.50) (1.19) (1.85) (1.68) (0.01) (0.18) (0.04)
Constant 13.39*** 18.57*** 13.97*** 13.85* 26.89** 22.63*** 13.88*** 17.49* 14.00***
(3.53) (2.85) (4.42) (1.71) (2.50) (3.36) (4.17) (1.88) (5.76)
Observations 259 259 259 115 115 115 144 144 144
R-squared 0.31 0.39 0.39 0.47 0.35 0.33
Number of countries 25 25 25 25 25 25
Robust t statistics in parentheses




What is notable is that fiscal balance is consistently a strong positive determinant 
of economic growth, regardless of the lag structure, and particularly in recent period. 
Inflation, as a measure of macroeconomic stability is also a significant determinant, but 
less so in more recent years. 
 
D.  Institutional Quality & Size of Government 
 
  Does governance matter for economic growth? Unfortunately, available data on 
governance indicators are still insufficient to fully exploit the panel data on growth and 
its key determinants. Data from the Governance Indicators database cover only the latter 
half of our panel dataset, while BEEPS data cover only a couple of years. 
Notwithstanding these data difficulties, we use two measures of governance—
government effectiveness and quality of public sector management and institutions from 
the Governance Indicators and CPIA databases, respectively—to create sub-samples of 
countries with relatively lower, and relatively higher, governance (median) scores. We 
then re-run the baseline model using these sub-samples.  
 
  In addition, we test more formally for the existence of a statistical relationship 
between size of government and growth following the discussion in Section 2. We also 
                                                 
11 There are some variables that may affect both the evolution of reforms and economic growth. Dethier 
and others (1999) for example suggest that democracy may help promote market liberalization. To the 
extent that political freedom and civil liberties are also related to growth, these interrelationships need to be 
more fully accounted for.    18
allow for threshold effects. The results, accounting for both institutional quality and size 
of government, are presented in Tables 5 and 6.  
 
Table 5. Economic Growth and the Size of Government
By Government Effectiveness (WB Governance Indicator for Government Effectiveness)
All Countries Relatively More Effective Government Relatively Less Effective Government
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
War dummy -5.45* -5.92*** -5.67*** -3.16 -1.69 -2.66* -5.74 -4.7 -5.34*
(1.86) (3.18) (3.27) (1.55) (0.89) (1.66) (1.25) (1.48) (1.81)
Ln(inflation) (IMF) -1.91*** -1.83*** -1.85*** -0.88*** -1.06*** -1.00*** -2.97*** -2.38*** -2.72***
(5.95) (5.32) (6.30) (3.37) (3.89) (4.18) (4.80) (3.43) (4.48)
Fiscal balance (%GDP) (EBRD) 0.51*** 0.38*** 0.49*** 0.71*** 0.73*** 0.70*** 0.47*** 0.32 0.44***
(4.75) (3.24) (5.22) (7.20) (6.31) (7.01) (3.38) (1.64) (2.83)
Overall index of reform -0.01 -0.11 -0.05 0.34*** 0.36*** 0.34*** -0.59* -0.52 -0.62**
(0.08) (0.68) (0.40) (3.94) (2.90) (3.49) (1.66) (1.41) (1.99)
Expenditure (in percent of GDP) (<35%) -0.14 -0.25 -0.17* -0.08 -0.11 -0.12 0.00 -0.2 -0.08
(1.26) (1.65) (1.67) (0.15) (0.27) (0.29) (0.00) (0.85) (0.45)
Expenditure (in percent of GDP) (>=35%) -0.13* -0.41*** -0.26*** 0.13** 0.19* 0.14* -0.48*** -0.67*** -0.55***
(1.68) (3.85) (2.87) (2.16) (1.74) (1.84) (2.87) (3.60) (3.36)
Dummy (Expenditure>=35%) -0.52 0.12 0.09 -1.18 -0.62 -0.81 0.08 -0.93 -0.45
(0.43) (0.09) (0.08) (0.88) (0.60) (0.82) (0.03) (0.30) (0.15)
Constant 16.10*** 22.29*** 18.14*** 0.8 0.96 2.13 28.71*** 31.18*** 31.43***
(3.42) (3.34) (4.41) (0.04) (0.07) (0.16) (2.66) (2.71) (3.41)
Observations 295 295 295 160 160 160 135 135 135
R-squared 0.56 0.6 0.61 0.61 0.6 0.63
Number of countries 25 25 13 13 12 12
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
 
The results suggest the following: First, the impact of the size of government on 
economic growth is nonlinear. We experimented with plausible threshold values given 
the sample characteristics. We settled on a threshold value of 35 percent of GDP, which 
is roughly equal to the sample median and mean values and also yielded the strongest 
results.
12 The results in Table 1 provide strong evidence that at expenditure levels of 35 
percent of GDP or higher, public spending negatively affects growth. At levels below 35 
percent, public sector size has no robust measurable effect on growth (see also Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Size of Government and Economic Growth: Threshold Effects 
                                                 
12 Threshold estimation procedures developed by Hansen (2000) using our data set were performed by 
Emilia Skrok and yielded a similar threshold (34 percent of GDP). This contribution to the analysis is 





























The impact of the size of government on economic growth is likely to be 
nonlinear for several reasons. First, while small governments tend to concentrate 
spending on the provision of key public goods (rule of law, defense, infrastructure) and 
efficiency–improving services (education, health care), large governments tend to spend 
more on “unproductive” core government functions, social transfers, and subsidies that 
are not conducive to growth (discussed further below). Second, limited administrative 
capacity could be another reason why a threshold may exist in the way public spending 
affects growth. Administrative capacity improves only slowly, reflecting gradual 
improvements in public sector management and civil servant skills, yet expenditure 
programs may grow relatively swiftly, resulting in administrative bottlenecks, poor 
program design, and low expenditure effectiveness. Third, financing of big governments 
requires high levels of taxation that are likely to distort incentives for saving, investment, 
and work effort beyond some threshold level.
13 The general rule of thumb is that 
deadweight losses from taxes increase in proportion to the square of taxation.  
 
It may be argued that, regardless of whether the relationship between size of 
government and growth is nonlinear or not, the strong negative relationship between 
growth and the size of government at higher levels of expenditure may be an artifact of 
the data and thus driven by outliers. In particular, in the early transition period, the 
sample consisted of very large governments in countries experiencing a deep recession. 
From the mid-1990s, onward, the size of government, on average, is lower and much 
more stable, coinciding with the economic recovery. However, our further analysis 
indicates that restricting the sample to this period—that is, from the mid-1990s 
onwards—yields results that are similar to the baseline.
14 
                                                 
13 Regarding, for example, the decision to work, it is expected that an increase in income taxation will 
discourage labor supply (at least in the formal sector) when a point is reached where substitution effects 
that favor more leisure (which becomes less expensive in terms of foregone after-tax income) may prevail 
against income effects that encourage additional work effort as a result of the reduction in after-tax income. 
14 The results are available on request. That the baseline results are robust should not be surprising because, 
among other things, this exercise also effectively excludes the (early transition) period for which available 
data are likely to be of lower quality.   20
 
There is, however, on important qualification to the relationship between size of 
government and growth: This relationship is likely to depend on public sector 
governance. In countries where public sector governance is weak, misallocations of 
public expenditures and weak administrative capacity are likely to be exacerbated, 
making the non-linear impact of large government programs more pronounced.  In 
addition, taxes are likely to be more distortionary when governance is poor, with high 
compliance costs and bribery of tax officials adding to the impact of high and distorting 
tax rates.  In contrast, the threshold effects of big governments on growth may be 
mitigated by strong public institutions. The quality of institutions can thus be expected to 
mitigate the negative impact of public sector size on growth.  
 
Indeed, the results in Table 5 indicate that public sector size negatively affects 
growth, but much less so in countries with good institutions. The results are broadly 
consistent with regressions based on the CPIA measure of public sector quality (Table 6). 
In particular, focusing on the fixed effects regression results, public spending has a 
negative impact, while at levels below the threshold, there is no measurable impact on 
economic growth, but the impact is mitigated by governance. Governance also appears to 
mitigate the payoffs from macroeconomic stability; in particular, payoffs from 
macroeconomic stability seem higher in an environment characterized by good public 
sector institutions. The coefficient of fiscal balance, in particular, is generally measurably 
higher when governments are relatively more effective (Tables 5 and 6). 
 
Table 6. Economic Growth and the Size of Government
By Government Effectiveness (CPIA Indicator for Public Sector Management)
All Countries Relatively More Effective Government Relatively Less Effective Government
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
War dummy -5.45* -5.92*** -5.67*** 4.00 4.79* 4.22* -11.55*** -9.74*** -10.85***
(1.86) (3.18) (3.27) (1.06) (1.93) (1.89) (4.15) (3.81) (4.49)
Ln(inflation) (IMF) -1.91*** -1.83*** -1.85*** -1.16*** -0.80* -1.11*** -2.51*** -2.01*** -2.36***
(5.95) (5.32) (6.30) (3.54) (1.93) (3.01) (5.42) (3.79) (5.26)
Fiscal balance (%GDP) (EBRD) 0.51*** 0.38*** 0.49*** 0.42** 0.72*** 0.50*** 0.44*** 0.15 0.37***
(4.75) (3.24) (5.22) (2.41) (4.68) (3.67) (3.90) (0.94) (2.91)
Overall index of reform -0.01 -0.11 -0.05 0.18 0.41** 0.17 -0.38 -0.2 -0.33
(0.08) (0.68) (0.40) (1.22) (2.18) (1.14) (1.56) (0.75) (1.47)
Expenditure (in percent of GDP) (<35%) -0.14 -0.25 -0.17* -0.51*** -0.02 -0.47*** 0.13 -0.24 -0.01
(1.26) (1.65) (1.67) (2.80) (0.09) (3.84) (1.17) (1.22) (0.08)
Expenditure (in percent of GDP) (>=35%) -0.13* -0.41*** -0.26*** 0.03 0.38** 0.13 -0.30** -0.57*** -0.38***
(1.68) (3.85) (2.87) (0.39) (2.27) (1.04) (2.21) (3.89) (3.07)
Dummy (Expenditure>=35%) -0.52 0.12 0.09 1.92 1.15 1.65 -2.49 -2.23 -2.09
(0.43) (0.09) (0.08) (1.07) (0.75) (1.15) (1.50) (1.15) (1.12)
Constant 16.10*** 22.29*** 18.14*** 17.90** -5.55 16.83*** 19.00*** 24.41*** 21.58***
(3.42) (3.34) (4.41) (2.13) (0.61) (3.54) (3.19) (2.64) (3.05)
Observations 295 295 295 152 152 152 143 143 143
R-squared 0.56 0.6 0.39 0.4 0.68 0.72
Number of countries 25 25 13 13 12 12
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
E.  Does Public Investment Matter for Growth?  
 
As previously discussed, the broad literature on economic growth has provided 
mixed evidence on the link between public investment and economic growth. The   21
literature on transition economies is not an exception. We extend the baseline model to 
add a measure of public investment (capital spending in percent of GDP) and confirm the 
previous findings (Table 7). The OLS results suggest a statistically significant, but weak, 
link between public investment and growth in countries where the government is 




Table 7. Determinants of Economic Growth 1992-2004
Does Public Investment Matter?
All Countries Relatively More Effective Government Relatively Less Effective Government
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
War dummy -1.42 -1.42 -1.54 -1.14 -0.93 -1.08 0.99 -1.5 -0.94
(0.45) (0.66) (0.72) (0.60) (0.49) (0.59) (0.16) (0.37) (0.24)
Ln(inflation) (IMF) -1.75*** -1.23*** -1.49*** -0.85** -1.05*** -1.02*** -2.02*** -1.58** -1.72***
(5.19) (3.75) (4.89) (2.39) (3.79) (3.82) (3.67) (2.37) (2.95)
Fiscal balance (%GDP) (IMF) 0.64*** 0.83*** 0.80*** 0.79*** 0.88*** 0.87*** 0.67*** 0.74*** 0.72***
(6.12) (7.54) (7.93) (8.44) (8.01) (8.19) (5.04) (3.74) (4.28)
EDRD Index of small-scale privatization 0.81 4.63*** 2.82*** 0.89 2.67** 1.85* 3.90*** 5.07*** 4.62***
(1.08) (4.10) (3.17) (1.00) (2.17) (1.80) (2.77) (2.67) (3.04)
EDRD Index of price liberalization -1.55 -3.79*** -3.08** 2.66* -0.47 0.67 -4.17 -4.79** -4.53**
(0.65) (2.86) (2.48) (1.85) (0.28) (0.45) (1.31) (2.33) (2.41)
Public investment -0.04 0.00 0.03 0.33* 0.12 0.19 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02
(0.17) (0.02) (0.17) (1.73) (0.46) (0.81) (0.16) (0.03) (0.07)
Constant 13.7 7.7 12.06** -8.28 -1.04 -2.85 16.03 13.46 14.31
(1.43) (1.21) (2.15) (1.24) (0.16) (0.44) (1.34) (1.25) (1.56)
Observations 236 236 236 127 127 127 109 109 109
R-squared 0.43 0.52 0.52 0.55 0.51 0.53
Number of countries 24 24 12 12 12 12
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
 
F.  Model Uncertainty 
 
Up until now we have been using as a baseline model a parsimonious 
specification based on Fischer and Sahay (2000). This of course raises a few difficult 
questions:  (i) are the fundamental determinants of growth themselves changing over 
time? (see Brock and Durlauf 2003 on model uncertainty); and (ii) are the determinants 
of growth the same across countries? We make a preliminary effort to account for model 
uncertainty in the last section using recently developed methods in Bayesian Model 
Averaging (see Raftery 1995; Raftery and others 1997; Fernandez and others 2001; Sala-
i-Martin and others 2003). In brief, these methods average all possible models given a set 
of regressors and test for the likelihood that a variable is included in a model, using 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)-based tests. Given k number of regressors, the 
number of possible models (including the null model) is 2
k (e.g., given 15 regressors, the 
total number of possible models is 32,768). This is computationally very intensive and 
routines have been developed only recently. Nonetheless, accounting for model 
uncertainty using Bayesian techniques (not shown), our preliminary analysis suggests 
that fiscal balance and inflation are still statistically significant determinants of growth.
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This paper extends the early empirical literature on economic growth in transition 
economies, with particular focus on fiscal policy variables (fiscal balance as well as 
selected expenditure components). It utilizes a parsimonious model drawn from Fischer 
and Sahay (2000) of economic growth as a function of initial conditions, stabilization, 
liberalization and structural reform, consistent with existing empirical literature (as 
summarized for example in Havrylyshyn 2001). The paper expands the data used in 
previous analyses by some 7 to 10 years, extends the baseline model, explores potential 
sources of nonlinearities in the relationship between growth and public finance. The main 
findings are summarized as follows. 
 
First, the fiscal balance matters for growth. This is a departure from the “first 
generation” studies of economic growth that found little perceptible impact of fiscal 
balance on growth. This finding is nonetheless fully consistent with recent, growing 
evidence drawn from studies of fiscal consolidation in the region that a sound fiscal 
position boosts economic growth. The results are also based on a larger and more 
representative sample relative to the early literature on economic growth in transition 
economies. 
 
Second, the size of government matters for economic growth and the impact is 
nonlinear. The results reported in this paper shed light on the inconclusive literature on 
the links size of government and economic growth, while adding a new nuance: Beyond 
indicative expenditure thresholds (in percent of GDP), public spending has a negative 
impact on growth, while at levels below this indicative cutoff, there is no measurable 
impact. These findings, while new, are not completely surprising. As government 
expenditures grow, they may be associated with larger distortionary taxation and 
regulatory activities, potential less efficient provision of services, and new opportunities 
for rent-seeking and corruption. 
 
Finally, the quality of governance matters. The previous key finding is mitigated 
by the relative weakness of public sector institutions. In particular, the size of 
government has adverse consequences on growth, but not when the government is 
relatively more effective or public sector institutions are stronger. This is consistent with 
other strands of the literature that emphasize the interactions between growth and good 
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DATA APPENDIX 
Governance Indicators and Output Efficiency: Simple Correlations 
 
Our index of “government effectiveness,” drawn from the World Bank 
Governance Indicators database, claims to measure “competence of the bureaucracy and 
the quality of public service delivery.” Our other measure is an estimate of the average 
magnitude of bribes in percent of annual sales of surveyed firms, drawn from the BEEPS 
survey. How well does this score or index correlate with more “objective” measures of 
government efficiency? Herrera and Pang (2004) employ various methods of efficiency 
analysis using cross-country data on intermediate output indicators in education and 
public expenditures to estimate the “output efficiency” of governments. They produce 
indexes of how well governments produce education services for a given level of public 
resources. Among other indicators, they estimate the output efficiency index for 
secondary education enrollment (using data averaged over 1996-2002) based on Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). For the 20 transition economies in the Herrera-Pang 
sample, the value of this index ranges from 0.57 to 0.83, with higher values indicating 
greater efficiency. Notwithstanding the relatively small sample size, we examine how 
closely this index correlates with our measure of government effectiveness. 
 





































Figure 4 plots the output efficiency index separately for countries with relatively 
low and relatively high government effectiveness based on the median score of 
government effectiveness (the scores are between -2.5 and +2.5, where higher score 
indicate greater effectiveness). The results suggest that where government effectiveness 
scores are higher, efficiency levels are higher as well, on average. An alternative analysis 
based on the average magnitude of bribes (our other measure of governance) yields 
basically the same figure. We test this more formally and run two bivariate regressions of 
output efficiency index on our (continues) measure of government effectiveness and our 
(continues) measure of the magnitude of bribes (percent of annual sales), respectively. 
The result indicates a statistically significant link, albeit weak, at the 10 percent level 
(with R-squares of 0.14 and 0.11, respectively).   27
APPENDIX TABLES 
 
Appendix Tables 1-4 report the regression results based on equations 1, 2, and 3, 
using the growth data from national accounts (DDP); EBRD indexes of small-scale 
privatization, price liberalization, and overall reform progress; IMF data on inflation; and 
data from national authorities/World Bank (ECSPE) staff estimates for fiscal balances 
and public investments. 
 
Appendix Tables 5-8 report the regression results based on equations 1, 2, and 3, 
using the growth data from national accounts (DDP); EBRD data for fiscal balances as 
well as indexes of small-scale privatization, price liberalization, and overall reform 
progress; IMF data on inflation; and data from national authorities/World Bank (ECSPE) 
staff estimates for public investments. 
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Appendix Table 1  
Determinants of Economic Growth, 1992-2004 
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
(1) (2) (3)
War dummy -1.15 -1.15 -1.35
(0.40) (0.54) (0.63)
Ln(inflation) (IMF) -1.78*** -1.22*** -1.53***
(6.08) (3.74) (5.17)
Fiscal balance (%GDP) 0.62*** 0.76*** 0.75***
(5.16) (7.20) (7.55)
EBRD Index of Small-Scale Privatization 0.85 4.94*** 2.88***
(1.12) (4.41) (3.23)
EBRD Index of Price Liberalization -1.83 -3.59*** -3.15***
(0.85) (2.75) (2.59)
Constant 14.32* 5.39 12.04**
(1.87) (0.88) (2.31)
Observations 242 242 242
R-squared 0.41 0.51
Number of countries 24 24
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
Appendix Table 2  
Determinants of Economic Growth, 1992-2004: Using A Composite Measure of Reform 
Table 2. Determinants of Economic Growth, 1992-2004: Using composite measure of reform
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
(1) (2) (3)
War dummy -1.55 -1.83 -1.86
(0.53) (0.82) (0.85)
Ln(inflation) -2.12*** -2.00*** -2.07***
(7.15) (5.31) (6.66)
Fiscal balance 0.65*** 0.79*** 0.75***
(5.40) (7.29) (7.55)
Index of Reform Progress (IRP) -0.22* -0.11 -0.19
(1.83) (0.55) (1.46)
Constant 16.63*** 13.98** 16.15***
(4.53) (2.53) (4.19)
Observations 242 242 242
R-squared 0.42 0.46
Number of countries 24 24
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    29
Appendix Table 3 
Determinants of Economic Growth, 1992-2004: Varying Impact Over Time 
By Government Effectiveness (WB Governance Indicator for Government Effectiveness) 
 
Before 1998 1998 Onwards
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
War dummy -0.62 -1.74 -1.47 -0.88 -2.64 -1.7
(0.20) (0.82) (0.71) (0.25) (1.23) (0.80)
Ln(inflation) -1.68*** -1.77*** -1.68*** -1.53*** -1.77*** -1.58***
(5.31) (4.83) (5.25) (4.18) (4.51) (4.56)
Fiscal balance 0.67*** 0.81*** 0.77*** 0.54*** 0.64*** 0.64***
(5.27) (4.51) (4.59) (4.18) (3.29) (3.54)
Fiscal balance * Dummy (for years htrough 1998) -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 -0.12 -0.16 -0.14
(1.14) (1.23) (1.27) (0.58) (0.76) (0.70)
Index of Reform Progress -0.48*** -0.58*** -0.51*** -0.46*** -1.11*** -0.54***
(3.59) (2.72) (3.77) (3.58) (4.03) (4.32)
Index of Reform Progress * Dummy (for years through 1998) 0.76*** 0.76*** 0.76*** 0.68*** 0.70*** 0.67***
(3.62) (5.18) (5.39) (3.21) (4.76) (4.61)
Constant 23.06*** 26.37*** 24.15*** -0.45 41.45*** 0.92
(5.73) (4.38) (6.19) (0.09) (5.32) (0.20)
Observations 242 242 242 242 242 242
R-squared 0.48 0.52 0.52 0.57
Number of countries 24 24 24 24
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
 
Appendix Table 4 
Determinants of Economic Growth, 1992-2004:  
Does Public Investment Matter? 
All Observations OLS Fixed effects Random effects
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects Low Gov Eff High Gov Eff Low Gov Eff High Gov Eff Low Gov Eff High Gov Eff
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
War dummy -1.22 -1.13 -1.3 1.27 -0.75 -0.76 -0.63 -1.38 -0.45
(0.42) (0.52) (0.60) (0.22) (0.38) (0.19) (0.32) (0.34) (0.22)
Ln(inflation) -1.80*** -1.22*** -1.52*** -1.97*** -0.89** -1.72*** -1.01*** -1.59** -1.01***
(5.33) (3.64) (4.91) (3.53) (2.52) (2.96) (3.54) (2.36) (3.39)
Fiscal balance 0.61*** 0.76*** 0.75*** 0.70*** 0.75*** 0.71*** 0.80*** 0.69*** 0.80***
(5.17) (6.89) (7.30) (4.68) (6.78) (4.28) (6.64) (3.54) (6.47)
EBRD Index: Small-Scale Priv 0.77 4.89*** 2.82*** 4.03*** 1 4.58*** 2.42** 5.10*** 3.46***
(1.05) (4.27) (3.14) (2.86) (1.02) (3.06) (2.17) (2.67) (2.63)
EBRD Index: Price Lib -1.83 -3.57*** -3.03** -4.32 2.22 -4.41** 0.39 -4.50** -0.76
(0.77) (2.65) (2.40) (1.40) (1.39) (2.35) (0.24) (2.18) (0.42)
Public investment -0.03 0.04 0.07 -0.01 0.32 0.02 0.18 0.03 0.12
(0.12) (0.18) (0.34) (0.03) (1.61) (0.06) (0.72) (0.09) (0.43)
Constant 14.81 5.3 11.46** 15.97 -7.17 13.79 -4.51 11.87 -3.74
(1.56) (0.82) (2.01) (1.37) (1.02) (1.52) (0.66) (1.10) (0.52)
Observations 236 236 236 109 127 109 127 109 127
R-squared 0.41 0.51 0.52 0.46 0.52 0.49
Number of countries 24 24 12 12 12 12
Robust t statistics in parentheses. The country grouping is based on the median frequency of bribes.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    30
Appendix Table 5  
Determinants of Economic Growth, 1992-2004 
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
(1) (2) (3)
War dummy -4.66 -4.48** -4.54***
(1.62) (2.48) (2.60)
Ln(inflation) (IMF) -1.76*** -1.22*** -1.47***
(5.81) (4.08) (5.31)
Fiscal balance (%GDP) 0.60*** 0.68*** 0.68***
(5.76) (7.68) (8.30)
EBRD Index of Small-Scale Privatization 1.45** 3.86*** 2.78***
(2.09) (4.44) (3.79)
EBRD Index of Price Liberalization -1.78 -2.88*** -2.69***
(1.29) (2.88) (2.84)
Constant 12.04** 6.64 10.59**
(1.97) (1.25) (2.33)
Observations 295 295 295
R-squared 0.54 0.60
Number of countries 25 25
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
Appendix Table 6  
Determinants of Economic Growth, 1992-2004: Using A Composite Measure of Reform 
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
(1) (2) (3)
War dummy -5.70* -5.86*** -5.83***
(1.90) (3.15) (3.30)
Ln(inflation) -2.09*** -1.73*** -1.91***
(7.32) (4.92) (6.44)
Fiscal balance 0.61*** 0.74*** 0.70***
(5.78) (8.37) (8.56)
Index of Reform Progress (IRP) -0.1 0.01 -0.07
(0.91) (0.05) (0.58)
Constant 13.76*** 10.55** 12.96***
(3.76) (2.11) (3.53)
Observations 295 295 295
R-squared 0.53 0.57
Number of countries 25 25
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Appendix Table 7 
Determinants of Economic Growth, 1992-2004: Varying Impact Over Time 
By Government Effectiveness (WB Governance Indicator for Government Effectiveness) 
Before 1998 1998 Onwards
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
War dummy -4.7 -5.79*** -5.36*** -4.67 -7.24*** -4.67***
(1.62) (3.12) (3.09) (1.63) (3.93) (2.80)
Ln(inflation) -1.67*** -1.52*** -1.58*** -1.50*** -1.56*** -1.50***
(4.23) (4.22) (5.04) (3.84) (4.19) (4.76)
Fiscal balance 0.51*** 0.70*** 0.62*** 0.41*** 0.68*** 0.41**
(6.01) (4.07) (3.81) (4.80) (3.74) (2.45)
Fiscal balance * Dummy (for years htrough 1998) 0 -0.07 -0.04 0.05 -0.12 0.05
(0.02) (0.37) (0.21) (0.29) (0.63) (0.25)
Index of Reform Progress -0.38*** -0.34* -0.36*** -0.38*** -1.16*** -0.38***
(3.00) (1.69) (2.74) (3.13) (4.45) (3.51)
Index of Reform Progress * Dummy (for years through 1998) 0.62*** 0.51*** 0.56*** 0.51** 0.44*** 0.51***
(3.13) (3.45) (4.01) (2.56) (3.01) (3.38)
Constant 20.45*** 19.48*** 20.18*** 5.55 42.75*** 5.55
(5.30) (3.39) (5.28) (0.96) (5.68) (1.43)
Observations 295 295 295 295 295 295
R-squared 0.56 0.59 0.59 0.64
Number of countries 25 25 25 25
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
Appendix Table 8 
Determinants of Economic Growth, 1992-2004:  
Does Public Investment Matter? 
All Observations OLS Fixed effects Random effects
OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects Low Gov Eff High Gov Eff Low Gov Eff High Gov Eff Low Gov Eff High Gov Eff
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
War dummy -1.75 -1.81 -1.94 0.36 -1.15 -1.94 -0.89 -2.61 -0.53
(0.53) (0.84) (0.91) (0.05) (0.60) (0.50) (0.48) (0.64) (0.28)
Ln(inflation) -1.79*** -1.29*** -1.53*** -2.06*** -0.83** -1.73*** -1.00*** -1.61** -1.10***
(5.55) (3.92) (5.03) (3.89) (2.40) (2.98) (3.69) (2.45) (3.86)
Fiscal balance 0.59*** 0.76*** 0.74*** 0.63*** 0.77*** 0.70*** 0.77*** 0.73*** 0.76***
(5.44) (7.39) (7.80) (4.41) (8.47) (4.38) (7.83) (3.88) (7.37)
EBRD Index: Small-Scale Priv 1.06 4.80*** 3.07*** 4.24*** 1.32 4.87*** 1.80* 5.13*** 2.74**
(1.41) (4.25) (3.44) (2.99) (1.45) (3.22) (1.85) (2.72) (2.16)
EBRD Index: Price Lib -2.09 -4.07*** -3.50*** -4.85 2.43* -5.03*** 1.13 -5.27** -0.43
(0.88) (3.04) (2.80) (1.57) (1.70) (2.67) (0.77) (2.54) (0.25)
Public investment -0.05 0.01 0.03 -0.06 0.35* 0 0.2 0.03 0.05
(0.20) (0.05) (0.16) (0.18) (1.85) (0.02) (0.88) (0.09) (0.19)
Constant 14.97 8.17 12.81** 17.6 -9.17 15.40* -4.84 15.09 -1.39
(1.57) (1.27) (2.27) (1.51) (1.42) (1.68) (0.74) (1.39) (0.20)
Observations 236 236 236 109 127 109 127 109 127
R-squared 0.42 0.52 0.51 0.53 0.53 0.53
Number of countries 24 24 12 12 12 12
Robust t statistics in parentheses. The country grouping is based on the median frequency of bribes.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
  